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COMMENT
THE WISCONSIN PARTIAL VETO: WHERE ARE WE
AND HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE
DEFINITION OF "PART" AND THE TEST OF
SEVERABILITY
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intu-
itions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to
become.1
Oliver Wendell Holmes
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1930, Wisconsin governors have possessed the authority to veto
"parts" of appropriation bills under article V, section 10 of the Wisconsin
Constitution.2 Through a line of cases,3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
broadly interpreted the definition of "part" and whether a "part" of an ap-
propriation bill may be severed by veto.4
1. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., The Common Law, in THE COMMON LAW & OTHER WRITINGS
1, 1 (1982).
2. After legislative passage of the proposed amendment as Enrolled Jt. Res. 37, 1927 Wis.
Laws 986, and Enrolled Jt. Res. 43, 1929 Wis. Laws 1079, Wisconsin voters ratified the partial
veto amendment at the 1930 general election. As ratified in 1930, the constitutional amendment
stated that "[a]ppropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the
part approved shall become law." Wis. CONST. art. V, § 10.
3. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has interpreted the article V, section 10 grant of partial
veto authority on six separate occasions: State ax reL Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d
429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988); State ex reL Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539
(1978); State ex reL Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976); State ex rel.
Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662 (1940); State ex reL Finnegan v. Dammann,
220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936); State ex reL Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260
N.W. 486 (1935).
4. Arthur J. Harrington, The Propriety of the Negative-The Governor's Partial Veto Author-
ity, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 865 (1977); see Mary E. Burke, Comment, The Wisconsin Partial Veto:
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As Oliver Wendell Holmes indicated, in order to know an area of the
law, "we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become." 5
Therefore, this Comment will critically explore the development of the
court's definition of "part" and the test of partial veto validity.6 In Part II,
this Comment presents a cursory illustration of the current state of the gov-
ernor's partial veto power. Part III provides a historical summary of the
Wisconsin partial veto. Finally, Part IV analyzes in detail the six cases that
have dealt with the interpretation of "part" and the test of severability.
This Comment suggests that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's broad in-
terpretation of article V, section 10 provides no limitations upon a Wiscon-
sin governor's partial veto powers. In addition, this Comment argues for
adoption of the Hansen test of partial veto validity7 by either amendatory
efforts of the Wisconsin Legislature or judicial review by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
Currently, the Wisconsin governor may veto any part of an appropria-
tion bill as long as the portion of the bill remaining constitutes a "complete,
entire, and workable law."' The governor may delete individual words,
eliminate digits, and reduce the amounts of appropriations in a budget bill.9
However, the governor may no longer create new words by striking individ-
Past, Present and Future, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1395. See generally Glen 0. Robinson, Public
Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REv. 403 (1988); Jeffrey G. Knowles, Note,
Enforcing the One-Subject Rule: The Case for a Subject Veto, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 563 (1987); Ste-
phen Masciocchi, Comment, The Item Veto Power in Washington, 64 WASH. L. Rv. 891 (1989).
5. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 1; see also John P. Stevens, A Judge's Use of History-Thomas E.
Fairchild Inaugural Lecture, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 223 (discussing the importance of history on the
interpretation of law).
6. The author excludes from this analysis the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holdings concern-
ing what constitutes an "appropriation" bill and whether the "part" vetoed must be an appropria-
tion. This Comment focuses primarily on the court's analysis of the word "part" and whether
that "part" may be severed. Generally, these two principles govern the scope of the partial veto.
7. The Hansen test of partial veto validity, enunciated in the dissent of State ex rel. Kleczka
v. Conta, warrants only the veto of "individual components, capable of separate enactment, which
have been joined together by the legislature in an appropriation bill. That is, the portions stricken
must be able to stand as a complete and workable bill." Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 726, 264 N.W.2d
at 560.
8. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 437, 424 N.W.2d 385, 388
(1988).
9. Id.
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ual letters in the words of an enrolled bill.1° Guided by these standards, the
Wisconsin governor may even change legislative intent and policy.11
In 1991, Governor Tommy G. Thompson exercised his partial veto
power a record 457 times on the legislature's proposed 1991-93 state
budget.12 In one section of the state budget, Governor Thompson vetoed
parts of Section 2437d (Aid to Milwaukee Public Schools) "3 by deleting
words, digits, and punctuation marks to dramatically alter Section 2437d.1 4
Before partial veto, Section 2437d required the governor to submit a spend-
10. Wis. CONST. art. V, § 10(1)(c).
11. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 448, 424 N.W.2d at 392 (citing State ex rel. Sundby v.
Adamany, 71 Wis. 2d 118, 130, 237 N.W.2d 910, 916 (1976)). Wisconsin Senate does, however,
recognize a "germaneness" or "topicality" requirement. Id. at 451-52, 424 N.W.2d at 393-94.
12. The following list illustrates the number of partial vetoes executed by Wisconsin gover-
nors per legislative session from the creation of the partial veto power until the 1990-91 legislative
session:
1931: 12 1947: 4 1963: 0 1979: 103
1933: 12 1949: 0 1965: 1 1981: 121
1935: 0 1951: 0 1967: 0 1983: 70
1937: 0 1953: 2 1969: 27 1985: 78
1939: 1 1955: 0 1971: 20 1987: 408
1941: 1 1957: 2 1973: 57 1989: 281
1943: 0 1959: 0 1975: 73 1991: 457
1945: 1 1961: 2 1977: 111
TOTAL: 1844
WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, EXECUTIVE PARTIAL VETO OF 1991 ASSEMBLY
BILL 91 (Executive Budget Bill Passed by the 1991 Wisconsin Legislature, 1991 Wisconsin Act
39) 2 (1991) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE PARTIAL VETO].
13. Id at 11.
14. Section 2437d deals with the repeal and recreation of Wis. STAT. § 119.80 (1991-92). As
proposed by the legislature, the statute read as follows (redlined portions vetoed):
119.80 Spending Plan. (1) By ,muray i, 1993, the governor and te Stat. Sp irntmdn
shall submit to the joint committee on finance, and to iht apprOp.ai.t sanding omi esUU±
i. each hou of the ig slan = ,ad., b. 13.172(3) a joint proposal for the expenditure of
the funds in the appropriation under s. 20.255 (2) (ec) in the 1992-93 school year-othr
th, i th f ,d, specified ndm n . 119.32 (3). Within 30 days after receiving the proposal,
eac
h 
such standhis committ e ay msdudL, writeun ±r.cunrimdaiunb an the proposal to
(2)-The joint committee on finance shall sch dule a nreth ito approve, modify-or
disapprore the plan.
(3) AM. chlge to a pvOYOal apPrOved by 5 ejoiu, committee OIL fin*anl, is ,bje
tfm .umnu'i Leview aid appoval.
After partial veto the statute reads as follows:
119.80 Spending Plan. the governor shall submit to the joint committee on finance a pro-
posal for the expenditure of the funds in the appropriation under s. 20.255 (2) (ec) in the
1992-93 school year. Within 30 days after receiving the proposal, the joint committee on
finance shall approve the plan.
EXECUTIVE PARTIAL VETO, supra note 12, at 11.
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ing proposal to the Joint Committee on Finance 5 for approval, modifica-
tion, or denial.' 6 After the partial veto, Section 2437d required the Joint
Committee on Finance to approve the governor's plan within thirty days. 17
Additionally, after the partial veto the Joint Committee on Finance could
neither modify nor deny the expenditure but could only approve the
funds.'" Therefore, the partial veto of Section 2437d transformed the Joint
Committee on Finance into a rubber stamp, insofar as aid to the Milwaukee
public schools is concerned.
In Section 2135t (State School Property Tax Credit), Governor Thomp-
son again vetoed individual words, digits, and punctuation marks.' 9 As
passed by the legislature, Section 2135t created a complex mechanism
for determining the tax credit that municipalities would receive for state
school properties. 20 The Section determined the property tax credit for
each municipality by utilizing such variables as fair market value and the
consumer price index.2 ' Exercising his partial veto authority, Governor
Thompson formed a new sentence by eliminating more than 100 words in
the original section while leaving only seven.2 2 In so doing, Governor
15. IdL "The committee is a joint standing committee composed of 8 senators and 8 repre-
sentatives and must include members of the majority and minority party in each house. A senate
member and an assembly member are designated as chairpersons by the presiding officers of their
respective houses." WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN 1991-
92 BLUE BOOK 276-77 (1991) [hereinafter BLUE BOOK].
16. EXECUTIVE PARTIAL VETO, supra note 12, at 11.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 1991 Wis. Laws 39, § 2135t.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Section 2135t read as follows (redlined portions vetoed):
SECTION 2135t. 79.10 (4) of the statutes is xeym.fed mid Ie ,ed to read:
79.10-(4)-S-T-ATE SCHOOL PRO6PERTY TAX CREDIT. fit i993 ,,,d .. ..
ac... .uni.ipaliy .. a.. e ..... the appropriations under s. 20.835 (3)(c) and (" )m
4UULauI. dI.tLmined, by LinIiplying die h t t by dn siumuated fbfi mnetk, vau,.
i, of $2,500, but nt exceedin, the fulowinig totaf etim.ated fa mket midue, of
Mvlny Pyal of tanauk pLOPjLty OIL whi pnha yLncipd duweniu is focat-d inn n uteipal-
i y .. f .wichi a f.,a, fi a ,.diL l dei sub. (," (b) "i-'b- is made by th m .... of thFpih,,iaf~ dwellii
(a)-f993 $30000
"-In 1994, $35600,
(c) f. 1995 and fhnaflev, $35,000 pl a m t i.n c ounded to .hneatest
Sff Ua toU4 U LL pclhltag iQLvACa ini tl*e WUfLIMUL priceP index fyi a11 U~LbmJ cosme
U.S. city • compute by L.. f.de.af dvPM t yr fbi tim ye..w. di .
Decemi.b, H1 prcdn .ln yean r f the PLUjPCny ta fV tu Whnichl t  Credit. uppl- .Ulti-
pfied by th maianaou niut yr esiae fih make valune 6igjib1e for theL credit ini Lli
YaL preceding5 the y.a± y , of th e prty tax f evy o iil the credi appi.
After veto the section reads as follows:
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Thompson created a general tax credit fund that was not linked to
property.23
These examples illustrate the Wisconsin governor's broad power to veto
parts of an appropriation bill.2 4 However, in order to fully understand the
scope and implications of the governor's current partial veto power, the
history of the partial veto must be explored.
III. HISTORY OF ARTICLE V, SECTION 10 OF THE WISCONSIN
CONSTITUTION AND THE CREATION OF THE WISCONSIN
PARTIAL VETO
The original Wisconsin Constitution, adopted in 1848, did not provide
the governor with the power of partial veto.25 Under the 1848 Wisconsin
Constitution, the governor accepted or denied the bill as a whole. The gov-
ernor's veto authority lost much in the way of strength when the Wisconsin
Legislature embraced the use of the omnibus appropriation bill26 in the
SECTION 2135t. 79.14 of the statutes is to read:
79.14 SCHOOL TAX CREDIT. the appropriations under s. 20.835 (3)(b) is
$319,305,000.
Id Using the partial veto, Governor Thompson created Section 79.14 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
In addition, he changed the property tax credit to a general tax credit. As the legislature passed
the section, the tax credit would be determined on a case by case basis. As created by the Gover-
nor Thompson, Section 79.14 provides a general fund for school tax credit.
23. Id
24. The above examples of the governor's partial veto authority were selected to illustrate the
breadth of the governor's power to veto in part. Governor Thompson exercised the partial veto
457 times on the 1991-92 budget bill, providing an ample source of examples.
Section 2685m and Sections 9238-47 provide additional examples of the extent of the Wiscon-
sin governor's partial veto powers. Both sections were originally more than 150 words in length.
After veto, both sections contained only one sentence. The partial veto of Sections 9238-47 illus-
trates Governor Thompson's creative use of the partial veto. He combined words, digits, and
punctuation marks from three different sections to create a new piece of legislation. 1991 Wis.
LAWS 39, §§ 2685m, 9238-47.
25. The Wisconsin Constitution declared that:
Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with
his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objec-
tions at large upon the journal, and proceed to reconsider it.
WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1848).
26. In Martin v. Zimmerman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined omnibus appropriation
bills and their purpose as:
[Tihe practice of jumbling together in one act inconsistent subjects in order to force a
passage by uniting minorities with different interests when the particular provisions could
not pass on their separate merits, with riders of objectionable legislation attached to gen-
eral appropriation bills in order to force the governor to veto the entire bill and thus stop
the wheels of government or approve the obnoxious act.
233 Wis. 442, 447-48, 289 N.W. 662, 664 (1940).
1993]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
1911 legislative session.2 7 Preceding state budgets had been "enacted as a
series of agency appropriation bills, permitting a governor to veto individual
appropriations by vetoing individual bills. By contrast, packaging multiple
budget and policy items together in an omnibus appropriations bill forced
the governor into an 'all or nothing' appropriation veto situation."2
On August 7, 1913, Governor Francis E. McGovern delivered a special
message to the legislature expressing his discontent with the legislature's
use of the omnibus appropriation bill:
[T]he significant result of the change (to omnibus appropriation
bills) has been to practically nullify the executive veto with respect
to all financial measures.... The only alternative presented there-
fore was to sign these bills, defective in a number of particulars as I
regarded them, or to veto them as a whole, thus rejecting what I
approved as well as what I disapproved.29
Governor McGovern also argued that the legislature's use of the omnibus
appropriation bill skewed the balance of power in favor of the legislature:
[U]nder the budget plan of appropriating money the executive de-
partment no longer exercises the influence or power it once had or
was intended by the constitution to possess. It seems to me therefore
something should be done to restore matters to the equilibrium of
power and responsibility that has always existed between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government in respect to these
matters.3 °
Speaking out against the imbalance, Governor McGovern pleaded for addi-
tional gubernatorial power: "With the introduction of the budget system
and the framing of money bills as omnibus measures, authority should be
conferred upon the governor that he does not now possess. ,31
Fourteen years later, a constitutional amendment was introduced in the
legislature to provide the governor with additional veto authority.32 The
proposed amendment would have permitted the governor of Wisconsin to
"disapprove or reduce items or parts of items in any bill appropriating
27. WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, THE PARTIAL VETO IN WISCONSIN-
AN UPDATE, INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN 87-1B-3, at 2 (1988) [hereinafter PARTIAL VETO].
28. Burke, supra note 4, at 1399; see also Harrington, supra note 4, at 876 (stating that Wis-
consin governor placed in a precarious veto situation).
29. PARTIAL VETO, supra note 27, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. S.J. Res. 23, 1925-26 Wis. Legis. (1925).
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money."33 However, the proposed amendment did not pass the Senate or
the Assembly.34
In 1927, the legislature proposed another constitutional amendment
that permitted the governor to veto "parts" of an appropriation bill. 35 The
1927 and 1929 legislatures passed the amendment, which was subsequently
placed on the November 1930 general election ballot.36 Wisconsin voters
ratified the partial veto amendment by a five-to-three margin.3 ' Therefore,
as of 1930, the Wisconsin Constitution authorized the governor to veto ap-
propriation bills in whole or in' part.38
The amendment provided the governor with additional power to correct
the imbalance between the legislature and the governor. However, the
scope of that new veto power was vested in the word "part" and the extent
of that power was unknown and untested.
IV. THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT AND THE PARTIAL VETO
A. First Interpretation
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first interpreted the scope of the partial
veto power under article V, section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution in
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. S.J. Res. 35, 1927-28 Wis. Legis. (1927). Interestingly enough, although the word "part"
was used in the resolution, "Senator William Titus [who introduced the amendment] requested
that the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau draft a resolution 'to allow the Governor to veto
items in appropriations bills.' However, there is no record of hearings concerning the use of 'part'
as opposed to 'item' in this resolution." Harrington, supra note 4, at 877 n.43 (citing LEGISLA-
TIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, THE USE OF THE PARTIAL VETO IN WISCONSIN, INFORMATIONAL
BULLETIN 75-IB-6, at 2 (1975)).
In addition, a cover sheet of the drafting records of 1927 S.J. Res. 35, signed by Senator
William Titus and dated February 8, 1927, states, "res. to permit Gov. to veto items in app. bills."
Drafting Records, S.J. Res. 35, 1927-28 Wis. Legis. (1927), microformed on 1927 Senate Joint
Resolutions 1 to 73 (State Microform Lab.).
In a letter dated February 18, 1927, the Chief of the Legislative Reference Library wrote
Senator Titus and stated, "Enclosed herewith is a revised draft of the Joint Resolution you asked
us to prepare, to allow the Governor to veto items in appropriation bills." Id. Choosing the word
"part" while referring to the resolution as a resolution allowing the veto of "items" suggests that
Senator Titus and the Chief of the Legislative Reference Library used the terms interchangeably.
36. PARTIAL VETO, supra note 27, at 3.
37. Id. The partial veto amendment was approved by a statewide popular vote with 252,655
in favor of the amendment and 153,703 opposed. Id.
38. The Wisconsin Constitution as amended in 1930 read:
Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the governor .... Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by
the governor, and the part approved shall become law, and the part objected to shall be
returned in the same manner as provided for other bills.
WIS. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1930).
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State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry.39 On April 2, 1935, the
Wisconsin Telephone Company filed an original action with the state
supreme court asserting that Governor Philip La Follette's veto of certain
parts of Assembly Bill 484 was unconstitutional. 1 Wisconsin Telephone
asserted that the governor's partial veto powers did not include the sever-
ance of provisos or conditions inseparably connected to appropriations.42
In an opinion written by Justice Fritz, the court upheld Governor La
Follette's partial vetoes.43 The court held that the portions of Assembly
Bill 48 "were not provisos or conditions which were inseparably connected
to the appropriation bill."'  The court began its analysis by observing that
article V, section 10 granted the governor the power to veto in whole or in
part.45 Reasoning that the drafters of the 1930 amendment had specifically
chosen the word "part" over the word "item" to define the scope of the veto
power,46 the court concluded that "part" provided a broader meaning than
"item," and that the legislature intended a broad grant of veto power.47
Because "part" was not given any special or technical meaning within
article V, section 10, the ordinary meaning of the word would be given
effect. 48 The court, citing Webster's New International Dictionary, defined
"part" as:
One of the portions, equal or unequal, into which anything is di-
vided, or regarded as divided; something less than a whole; a
number, quantity, mass, or the like, regarded as going to make up,
with others or another, a larger number, quantity, mass, etc.,
39. 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W. 486 (1935).
40. 1935 Wis. Laws ch. 15 (A.Bill 48). Assembly Bill 48 was titled, "An act to raise revenues
for emergency relief purposes, and making appropriations," and the bill's primary purpose was
the appropriation by the state of funds necessary for emergency relief. Sections I and 9 of the bill
declared the purpose of the legislature, Sections 2-7 provided for the distribution of the appropri-
ated funds, and Section 8 contained provisions for appropriation of the funds for relief efforts.
Henry, 218 Wis. at 307-08, 260 N.W. at 489.
41. Governor La Follette approved all of Assembly Bill 48 except for Sections 1, 8.3-.9, and
9. Sections 1 and 9 stated the legislative intent of the act. Henry, 218 Wis. at 308-09, 260 N.W. at
489-90.
42. Id. at 303-04, 260 N.W. at 487-88.
43. Id. at 306, 260 N.W. at 488.
44. Id. at 309, 260 N.W. at 490.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 313, 260 N.W. at 491. The court reasoned that if the legislature wanted to limit the
governor to the veto of an "item" or "part of an item," it could have "qualifi[ed] or limit[ed] the
well known meaning and scope of the word 'part'." Id. This line of inference suggests that the
use of "part" instead of "item" signaled a broad grant of authority by article V, section 10 of the
Wisconsin Constitution.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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whether actually separate or not; a piece, fragment, fraction, mem-
ber or constituent.4 9
Thus, the court concluded that the portions of the bill constituted parts of
an appropriation bill that would be subject to partial veto.50
Next, the court analyzed whether the "part" was severable from the rest
of the bill under the Wisconsin Constitution.51 The court reasoned that the
provisions were severable because they "were not provisos or conditions
upon which the appropriation in the approved portions [of the bill] was
made dependent or contingent."52 Thus, the central issue concerning the
propriety of the governor's partial veto developed into whether a "part" of
an appropriation bill was separable and therefore severable.5 3
The Wisconsin Supreme Court began its analysis of separability with the
text of Assembly Bill 48.14 Looking to the four corners of the text, the
court noted "an entire absence of any expressed proviso or condition, or
otherwise expressly stated connection between the parts disapproved and
the parts which were approved by the governor. '55  In addition, the court
stated that the "parts" approved, "as they were in the bill, as it was when
originally introduced, and as they continued therein at all times and are still
49. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcrIoNARY 1781 (2d ed. 1934)). This
argument provides no limitations on the partial veto power. The problem with the court's defini-
tion of "part" is that the definition is so broad as to be meaningless. The statement by Oliver
Wendell Holmes that "the life of law has not been logic" and has a "good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed," seems to apply here.
HOLMES, supra note I, at 1.
50. Note that in the present case, the court was considering the severability of whole sections
and subsections of Assembly Bill 48, and that the analysis presented was not geared toward the
partial vetoes of words, letters, numerals, and punctuation marks. As one commentator noted:
Henry, however, evaluated gubernatorial veto of large "parts": sections and subsections of
a legislative bill. To the Henry court, a large "part" had an unambiguous meaning. Later
litigation concerned the partial veto of ever smaller "parts" of legislative bills. The Henry
opinion does not reflect the court's anticipation that its textual analysis eventually would
be applied to individual digits and letters, or that the meaning of a "part" itself would
become completely ambiguous.
Burke, supra note 4, at 1403.
51. Henry, 218 Wis. at 308 n.1, 260 N.W. at 489 n.1.
52. Id. at 313-14, 260 N.W. at 491. The court seems to be saying that there are essentially
two elements to be considered in determining the governor's scope of partial veto powers under
article V, section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution. First, it must consider whether the portion
vetoed is a "part." Second, it must ask whether that "part" is an inseparable proviso or condition.
Because the element of whether a portion of a bill is a "part" is easily satisfied, limits to the scope
of the governor's veto power must necessarily reside in the second element.
53. Id. at 314-17, 260 N.W. at 492-93.
54. Id. at 314-16, 260 N.W. at 491-92.
55. Id. at 314, 260 N.W. at 491.
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in chapter 15, Laws of 1935, constitute[d] ... a complete, entire, and work-
able law."5 6
Furthermore, according to Section 10 of Assembly Bill 48 and Chapter
15 of the Laws of 1935, an express provision stated that "[i]f any provisions
of this act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this act and the application of such provisions to
other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby. '5 7 This ex-
press severability provision negated any inference that the parts approved
by the governor depended upon all the other provisions. 8
The court also stated that it is well established in Wisconsin law that the
elimination of material provisions in an act does not render the remaining
valid provisions invalid.59 The court held that "if the part upheld consti-
tutes . . . a complete law in some reasonable aspect," that part should be
valid, "unless it appeared from the act itself that the legislature intended it
to be effective only as an entirety and would not have enacted the valid part
alone.",60
Citing State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sande, the court affirmed that:
If a statute consists of separable parts and the offending portions
can be eliminated and still leave a living, complete law capable of
being carried into effect "consistent with the intention of the legisla-
ture which enacted it in connection with the void part," the valid
portions must stand. This is the rule and it has been consistently
followed.61
Thus, the court in Henry expressed an awareness and sensitivity toward the
intentions of the legislature. Henry hinted that any partial veto that would
56. Id.
57. Id. at 315-16, 260 N.W. at 492.
58. Id. at 316, 260 N.W. at 492.
59. Id. Henry analyzed the separability issue by comparing what happens to a law when a
part has been deemed unconstitutional with what happens to a bill when a part has been deleted
by the governor's veto. Id. at 317, 260 N.W. at 493. Although this analogy effectively explains
whether an act can survive after a part has been deleted for constitutional purposes, the analogy
loses strength when applied to the governor's partial veto. After the legislature passes a bill and
the executive approves it, the bill, as envisioned by both branches, becomes law and contains the
force of law. In an enforceable law, a presumption exists to preserve what remains after an uncon-
stitutional part is excised. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sande, 205 Wis. 495, 503, 238 N.W. 504, 507
(1931). However, after a legislature passes a bill and the executive approves and disapproves
certain portions, the bill becomes transformed with the approved portions becoming law and the
disapproved portions becoming extinguished. In this second instance, the approved portions of
the bill should not be entitled to the presumption of preservation because what remains after
partial veto has only been envisioned by the executive and not the legislature.
60. Henry, 218 Wis. at 316, 260 N.W. at 492.
61. Id. at 316, 260 N.W. at 491-92 (citing Reynolds, 205 Wis. at 503, 238 N.W. at 507).
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leave a complete and workable law unreasonable and inconsistent with the
legislature's intent could be considered invalid.
Further, Henry reasoned that there would be no difficulty considering
the deleted portions of Assembly Bill 48 as independent and separable por-
tions of the act if those portions were later considered to be unconstitu-
tional.62 In the same vein, the court stated that there would be no difficulty
considering the approved remains of Assembly Bill 48 to exist indepen-
dently of the eliminated parts if the vetoed parts were later held unconstitu-
tional and what remained constituted a complete and enforceable law.63
In addition, Henry articulated the policy lurking behind the power of
the governor's partial veto: "[T]here is nothing in that provision which
warrants the inference or conclusion that the governor's power of partial
veto was not intended to be as coextensive as the legislature's power to join
and enact separable pieces of legislation in an appropriation bill." 4
The court reasoned that because the legislature is able to use the omni-
bus bill, "there are reasons why the governor should have a coextensive
power of partial veto, to enable him to pass, in the exercise of his quasi-
legislative function, on each separable piece of legislation."65 Therefore, the
policy behind the partial veto empowered the governor to separate pieces of
legislation that the legislature had packaged together within one omnibus
appropriations bill.66
62. Id. at 317, 260 N.W. at 493.
63. Id
64. Id. at 315, 260 N.W. at 492.
65. Id. This policy consideration provides the foundation for the Hansen test of severability.
The power of the legislature to put separate pieces of legislation together in one bill should be
countered by a governor's power to unpack these separate pieces of legislation. Therefore, the
policy reasons behind Henry suggest that article V, section 10 provides the governor with only
enough veto authority to unpack the various pieces of legislation that the legislature has bound
together in an omnibus bill.
66. The view that the governor's veto powers are coextensive with the legislature's power to
pack appropriation bills exhibits a concern by the court for the balance of powers between the
executive and legislative branch. The court's sanctioning of the governor's quasi-legislative partial
veto power seems to be a direct response to the loss of veto power by the governor due to the
advent of the omnibus appropriation bill. One commentator suggests that "[t]he opinion in Henry
was also significant in that the court implied that it would not be influenced by the restrictive
notion of separation of powers so frequently employed by courts in other jurisdictions to invali-
date a governor's exercise of the veto authority." Harrington, supra note 4, at 879-80. Harring-
ton's conclusion that the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Henry would not be influenced by
separation of powers seems a bit extenuated. The Henry court did not allow a strict view of
separation of powers to become an obstacle to correcting the legislature's overreach due to the
omnibus bill. However, the court's sanction of the governor's quasi-legislative powers does not
necessarily mean that the court threw out the doctrine of separation of powers. The doctrine of
separation of powers may still operate, in this case, when the governor's partial veto exceeds the
legislature's power to join and enact separate pieces of legislation in an appropriation bill.
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The court held that because the declarations in Sections 1 and 9 of the
bill only stated the intentions of the legislature, their enactment would not
result in any "enforceable rule of conduct or action which would have con-
stituted law" and, thus, no real change existed in the bill's operation.67 Be-
cause the changes created by Governor La Follette's partial veto were
reasonable and consistent with the legislature's intent, Henry concluded
that the portions of Assembly Bill 48 vetoed by Governor La Follette were
not so inseparably connected with other parts of the bill that they could not
be severed.68
Henry provided the first interpretation of the partial veto authority of
article V, section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court concluded
that the validity of a partial veto depended upon whether the portion vetoed
was a "part" and whether that "part" was severable. To determine whether
a part was severable, the court conducted a textual search for express lan-
guage that indicated whether the legislature intended any "part" of the bill
to be inseparable. The court then proceeded to examine whether the ap-
proved portions of the bill constituted a complete and workable law. In
addition, the court hinted that a partial veto may be considered invalid if
the result created is unreasonable and inconsistent with the legislature's
intent.
B. Finnegan v. Dammann and Martin v. Zimmerman: The Early Years
Shortly after State ex rel. Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Henry, the gover-
nor's exercise of the partial veto prompted judicial review in State ex rel.
Finnegan v. Dammann.69 The central issue in Finnegan was what consti-
tuted an "appropriation bill."7 Before the court analyzed that issue, how-
ever, it provided a summary of Henry: "(1) that the 1930 amendment
permits the veto by the governor of any separable part of an appropriation
bill; and (2) that this power to partially veto exists, although the part vetoed
does not deal with appropriations."'7 1 In spite of summarizing Henry, the
court proceeded to state that "[s]ince the question here is whether Bill No.
312, S., was an appropriation bill, the doctrine of the Telephone Case
[Henry] is not determinative here."'7 2 The Finnegan court held that the par-
67. Henry, 218 Wis. at 317, 260 N.W. at 493.
68. Id.
69. 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 622 (1936).
70. Id. at 146, 264 N.W. at 623.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 147, 264 N.W. at 623.
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tial veto authority of the governor was restricted to bills containing an ex-
press appropriation. 3
Finnegan added nothing to Henry's analysis of the definition of "part"
and the test of severability. Finnegan did not provide an analysis of Henry,
but only presented a summary of Henry's holdings. Indeed, Finnegan
stated that the doctrine in Henry was inapplicable to the case at hand.
In 1940, the court addressed the alteration of legislative policy by par-
tial veto in State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman.74 In Martin, the legislature
had passed provisions that provided direct state aid to localities within the
state.75 However, Governor Julius Heil struck certain provisions and sad-
dled the costs of aid upon the localities themselves.76 The respondent con-
tended that Governor Heil's use of the partial veto "so changed the
legislative program or policy as to render the parts approved invalid."'77
According to the court, the parties did not contest whether the parts
approved by Governor Heil left a complete body of law of proper subject
matter for separate enactment by the legislature.78 Even though this issue
was not in contention between the parties, the court, citing Henry, con-
cluded that the approved parts of the bill in question constituted an "effec-
tive and enforceable law on fitting subjects for a separate enactment by the
legislature. ' 79 Thus, Martin decided an issue that was not raised by the
parties, but rather by the court.
Additionally, the respondent, citing State ex rel. Reynolds v. Sande, ar-
gued that although a part of a statute may be distinct and literally separable
from the rest of the bill, this does not necessarily mean that the part may be
disconnected from legislative intent.80 However, the court recalled that in
Henry, the partial veto effectuated a change in policy that was upheld.8
73. Id. at 148-49, 264 N.W. at 624. Finnegan concluded that the vetoed bill "deals with
appropriations neither in the title nor in the body of the act, and would not be considered such a
bill either in common speech or in the language of those who deal with legislative or governmental
matters." Id at 149, 264 N.W. at 624.
74. 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662 (1940).
75. Respondents Brief at 47, State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662
(1940) (State No. 21).
76. Id.
77. Martin, 233 Wis. at 445, 289 N.W. at 663.
78. d at 449, 289 N.W. at 665.
79. Id.
80. Respondents Brief at 46, Martin (No. 21).
81. Martin, 233 Wis. at 450, 289 N.W. at 665. The defective syllogism proffered by the court
does not strengthen the court's holding concerning the disregard of legislative intent but may
evidence a hidden policy decision by the court. Justice Hansen suggests that the court was avoid-
ing subjective tests of partial veto authority and, instead, opted for the objective test. State ex rel.
Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis. 2d 679, 721-22, 264 N.W.2d 539, 557-58 (1978) (Hansen, J., concurring
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Therefore, the court reasoned, if the approved parts taken as a whole pro-
vided a complete workable law, then the partial vetoes were valid, regard-
less of any change in legislative intent.8 2
In addition, Martin discussed the purpose of article V, section 10:
Its purpose was to prevent, if possible, the adoption of omnibus ap-
propriation bills, logrolling, the practice of jumbling together in one
act inconsistent subjects in order to force passage by uniting minori-
ties with different interests when the particular provisions could not
pass on their separate merits, with riders of objectionable legislation
attached to general appropriation bills in order to force the governor
to veto the entire bill and thus stop the wheels of government or
approve the obnoxious act.83
The court further stated that both the legislature and the people conferred
power upon the governor to approve appropriation bills in whole or in part
for the purpose of combating the "very definite evils" inherent in the law-
making processes in connection with appropriation measures.8 4
In deciding raised and unraised issues, Martin picked the "complete and
workable law" test out of Henry's analysis of partial veto validity to operate
as the sole factor in deciding whether disapproved parts were severable. By
stressing the complete and workable law test, the court fully disregarded
the importance of legislative intent with respect to severability. Henry con-
cluded, only after lengthy analysis, that the change in legislative intent was
minimal, and therefore the parts were not so inseparable that they could not
be severed. However, Martin chose to forget the concerns in Henry regard-
ing legislative intent.85
in part and dissenting in part). The court in Martin chose the complete, entire, and workable law
test. Id.
82. Martin, 233 Wis. at 450, 289 N.W. at 665. Here the court advances a defective argument.
In Henry, the court maintained an awareness that the approved remains after partial veto must be
reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
Martin wholly disregards these discussions in Henry. In Henry, the court examined the partial
vetoes' effect on the legislative intent and concluded that the change was minimal. Id. Henry's
authority should only extend to the proposition that small degrees of change in legislative intent
may not effect the validity of the partial veto. Henry, however, should lend no authority to the
holding of Martin, that any change in legislative intent is allowable.
83. Martin, 233 Wis. at 447-48, 289 N.W. at 664. But see James J. Gosling, Wisconsin Item-
Veto Lessons, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 295-98 (1986) (stating that Wisconsin governor's use of
the partial veto is primarily a tool of policy-making and partisan advantage rather than of fiscal
restraint).
84. Martin, 233 Wis. at 448, 289 N.W. at 664.
85. The author intentionally selected the word "chose" because the same seven justices de-
cided Henry (1935), Finnegan (1936), and Martin (1940):
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C. State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany: Solidification of the Complete and
Workable Law Test
On February 3, 1976, thirty-six years after Martin, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany 8 6 and reaffirmed
the broad power of the governor to veto parts of an appropriation bill. In
Sundby, Governor Patrick Lucey vetoed parts of nonappropriation lan-
guage from an appropriation bill providing for local referenda.87 As passed
by the legislature, the bill allowed towns to choose whether to hold a local
referendum before increasing their own tax levy.88 Governor Lucey's par-
tial veto deleted this optional language, however, and made mandatory
what the legislature had deemed optional.89
Before deciding the narrow question of severability, the court summa-
rized Henry and Martin. According to the court, Henry held that the term
"part" was broader than the term "item." 90 In addition, Henry held that
under article V, section 10 the governor could veto all parts of an appropri-
ation bill, unless the parts constituted inseparable conditions or provisos
tied to an appropriation. 91 Therefore, Sundby concluded that Henry al-
lowed severance of any part of an appropriation bill except provisos or con-
ditions placed upon an appropriation. Consequently, Sundby declared that
Martin had firmly established the complete and workable law test for deter-
mining the validity of the governor's partial veto.92
(1) Marvin B. Rosenberry 1916-50 (C.J. 1929-50)
(2) Chester A. Fowler 1929-48
(3) Oscar M. Fritz 1929-54 (C.J. 1950-54)
(4) Edward T. Fairchild 1929-57 (C.J. 1954-57)
(5) John D. Wickhem 1930-49
(6) George B. Nelson 1930-42
(7) Joseph Martin 1934-48
BLUE BooK, supra note 15, at 656.
The justices knew full well their discussion of the change of legislative intent in Henry. Their
exclusion of the topic in Martin indicates a desire to disregard any alteration of the legislature's
policies and affects how that alteration plays on the issue of severability.
86. 71 Wis. 2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976).
87. IJd at 121-24, 237 N.W.2d at 911-12.
88. Id
89. Id at 124, 237 N.W.2d at 912. In Sundby, Governor Lucey vetoed clauses of sentences.
Previously, partial vetoes involved only sections and subsections of appropriation bills. See State
ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis. 442, 289 N.W. 662 (1940); State ex rel. Finnegan v.
Damman, 220 Wis. 143, 264 N.W. 662 (1936); State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis.
302, 260 N.W. 486 (1936).
90. Sundby, 71 Wis. 2d at 129, 237 N.W.2d at 915.
91. Id Sundby provides that any part of an appropriation bill is separable unless that part is
a proviso or condition. Id. at 129-30, 237 N.W. at 916.
92. Id. at 130, 237 N.W.2d at 915-16. Sundby, however, based this holding on breakdowns in
the Martin analysis. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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In addition, Sundby provided constitutional justification for the gover-
nor's assumption of legislative powers. The court reasoned that although
the legislative power vests within the senate and the assembly,93 the gover-
nor possesses a role in that legislative process. The court stated that the
governor can:
(1) convene the legislature in emergencies,
(2) communicate to the legislature the condition of the state,
(3) recommend matters for the legislature's consideration,
(4) transact all necessary business with the officers of the
government,
(5) expedite legislative measures,
(6) execute laws, and
(7) submit a biennial budget report to the legislature.94
Therefore, the court reasoned, the governor has a role in legislation that is
recognized by the Wisconsin Constitution.95 Furthermore, Sundby stated
that Henry interpreted article V, section 10 to authorize the governor's use
of quasi-legislative powers.9 6 According to Sundby, Henry declared that
the quasi-legislative power was "intended to be as coextensive as the Legis-
lature's power to join and enact separable pieces of legislation in an appro-
priation bill." 97 Thus, Sundby concluded that the Wisconsin Constitution
authorized the governor's participation in legislation.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the governor may negate
what the legislature creates but may not affirmatively change the result in-
tended by the legislature.98 The court was not impressed by this subjective
distinction, stating that "[e]very veto has both a negative and affirmative
ring about it. There is always a change in policy involved." 99 The court
also thought that the constitutional requirements of article V, section 10
"fully anticipate[d] that the governor's action may alter the policy as writ-
ten in the bill sent to the governor by the legislature." 1" By refusing to
recognize the negative versus affirmative veto power distinction, Sundby re-
93. WIS. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
94. WiS. CONST. art. V, § 4.
95. Sundby, 71 Wis. 2d at 133-34, 237 N.W.2d at 916-17 (citing Wis. CONST. art. V, § 4 and
Wis. STAT. § 16.46 (1975)). The reasons cited in Sundby do not support the proposition that the
governor maintains a role in legislation. At most, the cited reasons support the proposition that
the legislative branch and the governor are co-partners in the overall governmental process.
96. Id. at 133-34, 237 N.W.2d at 917-18.
97. Id. at 133, 237 N.W.2d at 917 (citing Henry, 218 Wis. at 314-15, 260 N.W. at 492).
98. Id. at 134, 237 N.W.2d at 918.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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jected yet another subjective limitation on the governor's partial veto
authority.
Sundby firmly embraced the complete and workable law test of partial
veto validity. Under this objective test, the governor of Wisconsin may veto
parts of an appropriation bill if the approved parts constitute a complete
and workable law.1"1 In so holding, the court steered away from any sub-
jective limitations on the governor's partial veto power.102
D. State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta: Down the Primrose Path
Two years after Sundby, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded the
scope of the partial veto. In State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta,1 3 Acting Gov-
ernor Martin Schreiber vetoed clauses and words, thereby altering legisla-
tive intent."° As proposed by the legislature, the bill required taxpayers to
add one dollar to their tax liabilities if they wished that sum to go to the
state election campaign fund.' 5 Using the partial veto, Acting Governor
Schreiber changed the section to enable the taxpayer to check-off one dollar
from the state general funds for the purposes of the election campaign
fund.' 0
6
In an opinion written by Justice Nathan Heffernan, the court affirmed
severability as the test of partial veto validity.0 7 With an air of finality, the
court concluded that the "test of severability has clearly and repeatedly
been stated by this court to be simply that what remains be a complete and
101. The complete and workable law test establishes no limitations on the governor's use of
the partial veto. As Justice Hansen points out in State ex rel Kleczka v. Conta: "It is difficult to
envisage a governor deliberately exercising the partial veto power so as to produce a fragmentary
or unworkable law." 82 Wis. 2d 679, 723, 264 N.W.2d 539, 558 (1978) (Hansen, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The governor can sever any part of an appropriation bill. Whether
the governor may veto an inseparable condition or proviso remains an illusory limitation because
the court has yet to decide that issue.
102. Some subjective considerations are:
(I) alteration of legislative intent,
(2) negative v. creative powers of the partial veto, and
(3) general separation of powers concerns.
103. 82 Wis. 2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978).
104. Id. at 685, 264 N.W.2d at 541.
105. Id.
106. Id As passed by the legislature, the bill read as follows (vetoed portions redlined): "(1)
Every individual filing an income tax statement may designate that thei d1 . om tax fibiity b
increased-by $1 for deposit into the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund for the use of eligible
candidates under s. 11.50." Id The section as changed by partial veto reads: "(I) Every individ-
ual filing an income tax statement may designate $1 for the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund
for the use of eligible candidates under s. 1150." Id
107. Id at 705, 264 N.W.2d at 550.
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workable law."' 8 In addition, the court pointed out that Martin and
Sundby each held that the governor's partial veto may change legislative
policy because the governor's partial veto power is as coextensive as the
legislature's power to enact the laws.' 0 9 Thus, the governor's partial veto
"reflected a change of policy which the Governor had the authority to make
under the Constitution because his authority is coextensive with the author-
ity of the Legislature to enact the policy initially."'1 0
The petitioners also argued that the parts vetoed were inseparable
provisos and conditions of the appropriation and could not be partially ve-
toed.I'I However, the court declared that any discussion of the inseverable
nature of provisos and conditions in preceding cases constituted dicta."' l
Therefore, the governor possessed the authority to veto provisos or condi-
tions inseparably connected to an appropriation as long as what remained
constituted a complete and workable law.' 3
This expansive holding prompted the first dissenting opinion in the his-
tory of the Wisconsin partial veto." 4 Alarmed by the majority's holdings,
Justice Connor T. Hansen argued that the principle of separation of powers
demands "some palpable limit to the power of the governor to rewrite, by
the device of the partial veto, bills which have passed the legislature."' 1 5
According to Justice Hansen, the governor should not possess the power to
108. Id. at 707, 264 N.W.2d at 551.
109. Id. at 707-08, 264 N.W.2d at 552.
110. Id. at 709, 264 N.W.2d at 552. Relying on Henry and Martin, Kleczka implies that the
governor possesses a legislative power to alter legislative intent that is coextensive with the author-
ity of the legislature to enact the policy initially. Id. at 708-09, 264 N.W.2d at 552. However,
Henry held only that the governor possesses the power to separate pieces of legislation that the
legislature has joined and enacted. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
111. Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 711, 264 N.W.2d at 553.
112. Id. at 712, 264 N.W.2d at 553. Kleczka stated that earlier Wisconsin Supreme Court
dicta concerning the inseverable nature of provisos or conditions on appropriations represented
ill-considered statements offered to appease disappointed litigants. Id. at 713, 264 N.W.2d at 554.
113. Id. at 715, 264 N.W.2d at 555. In previous cases, the Wisconsin Supreme Court implied
that the governor's partial veto powers did not include the power to sever provisos or conditions
attached to appropriations. In a contrary ruling, Kleczka abandoned the last limitation upon the
governor's veto powers. Under Kleczka, the only test of partial veto validity and the only limita-
tion on the partial veto power is that the approved portions of the bill constitute a complete and
workable law. Id.
114. Id. at 716, 264 N.W.2d at 555 (Hansen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 719, 264 N.W.2d at 557. Justice Hansen addressed the separation of powers con-
cern by stating that:
Only the limitations on one's imagination fix the outer limits of the exercise of the partial
veto power by incision or deletion by a creative person. At some point this creative nega-
tive constitutes the enacting of legislation by one person, and at precisely that point the
governor invades the exclusive power of the legislature to make laws.
Id. at 720, 264 N.W.2d at 557.
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create new bills that will become law unless they are disapproved by two-
thirds of the state legislators.1 16
Justice Hansen suspected that the majority was hesitant to place subjec-
tive tests upon the powers of the partial veto:
The majority is rightfully wary of the elusive tests enunciated in
some other jurisdictions. To hold that the exercise of the partial
veto power may not have an "affirmative," "positive" or "creative"
effect on legislation, or that the veto may not change the "meaning"
or "policy" of a bill, as some courts elsewhere have done, would be
to involve this court in disingenuous semantic games.11 7
Without an objective point of reference, the court would have to decide
cases upon the "subjective assessment of the respective policies espoused by
the legislature and the executive, an unseemly result which would foster
uncertainty in the legislative process." ' Justice Hansen pointed out that
by utilizing subjective criteria for judging the validity of the governor's par-
tial veto, the court would, in effect, assume the function of the legislature. 19
Thus, the justice concluded that the court "steadily fashioned" an objective
standard to decide the validity of a partial veto.12
Justice Hansen expressed concern over the court's desertion of the
never-applied inseverability of conditions and provisos exception to the par-
tial veto power.1 21 This step, the justice argued, is required because when a
court "holds that a governor may freely alter the evident intent or policy of
the legislature, it is no doubt consistent to permit him to remove conditions
and contingencies, which, after all, are no more than manifestations of legis-
lative policy or intent." 122 Even so, Justice Hansen was unable to find lan-
guage in article V, section 10 supporting such a broad interpretation of the
partial veto power. 1
23
Consequently, Justice Hansen argued that the complete and workable
law test gave the governor virtually unlimited partial veto powers, and that
"[it is difficult to envisage a governor deliberately exercising the partial
116. Id
117. Id at 721, 264 N.W.2d at 557.
118. Id
119. Id at 721, 264 N.W.2d at 558.
120. Id See generally Harrington, supra note 4 (discussing objective test as an attractive
alternative to subjective tests fashioned in many other jurisdictions).
121. Kleczka, 82 Wis. 2d at 722, 264 N.W.2d at 558.
122. Id
123. Id Justice Hansen seemed to imply that the principle of separation of powers demanded
that any constitutional authorization of the governor's partial veto powers be narrowly construed
against intrusion.
1993]
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veto power so as to produce a fragmentary or unworkable law."' 24 In addi-
tion, he stated that the "standard adopted by the court poses no obstacles to
the use of deletions to produce a complete, entire, and workable bill con-
cerning a subject utterly unrelated to that of the bill as passed by the legisla-
ture." 125 Justice Hansen was unable to identify an obstacle, even implicit,
to the abuse of the veto power, and he feared that the court "may now have
painted itself into a corner, and that a time may come when we regret hav-
ing done so.",1 26
However, Justice Hansen pointed out that the original purposes of the
partial veto power and language from the court's earlier decisions could
provide an alternative solution. 2 7 "The governor's power to dismantle an
appropriations bill was made as extensive as the legislature's power to con-
struct such a bill from independent proposals capable of separate enact-
ment." 2 According to Justice Hansen, Henry intended the partial veto
power to be as "coextensive as the legislature's power to join and enact
separable pieces of legislation in an appropriation bill."' 29 Therefore, he
deduced, the partial veto power conferred upon the governor is "not a
power to reduce a bill to its single phrases, words, letters, digits and punctu-
ation marks."' 30 Justice Hansen proposed that the appropriate test of sev-
erability should be that both the approved remnants and the portions
stricken must be able to stand as "complete and workable laws."''
The adoption of this test, asserted Justice Hansen, would "define the
limits of the constitutional role of the governor."' 3 2 In addition, the gover-
nor's exercise of the partial veto would be limited to portions of an appro-
priation bill that were "grammatically and structurally distinct."' 33
Furthermore, this objective standard would be capable of clear and predict-
able application; thus the court would not be required to render decisions
based on subjective criteria.' 34 Most important, he stated that "this ap-
proach would protect the prerogatives reserved to the legislature by the
constitution and would fulfill the responsibility of this court to determine
124. Id. at 723, 264 N.W.2d at 558.
125. Id. at 723, 264 N.W.2d at 559.
126. Id. at 724, 264 N.W.2d at 559.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 724-25, 264 N.W.2d at 559-60.
129. Id. (citing State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 315, 260 N.W. 486,
492 (1935)).
130. Id. at 726, 264 N.W.2d at 560.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 727, 264 N.W.2d at 560.
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when the exclusive territory of one of our independent branches has been
invaded by another."1 35
In closing, Justice Hansen stated that "we have now arrived at a stage
where one person can design his own legislation from the appropriation
bills submitted to him after they have been approved by the majority of the
legislature."1 36 The "laws thus designed by one person become the law of
the sovereign State of Wisconsin unless disapproved by two-thirds of the
legislators."1 37 The justice ended his dissent by firmly proclaiming that he
was "not persuaded that [article V, section 10] was ever intended to pro-
duce such a result." 138
E. State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson: A Severed Court
A decade after Kleczka, the Joint Committee on Legislative Organiza-
tion 1 39 submitted the question of whether article V, section 10 granted Gov-
ernor Thompson the power to veto individual words, letters, and digits."4°
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, upheld Governor Thomp-
son's partial vetoes in State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson.14 ' The
majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Heffernan, held that "the gover-
nor may, in the exercise of the partial veto authority over appropriation
bills, veto individual words, letters and digits, and also may reduce appro-
priations by striking digits, as long as what remains after veto is a complete,
entire, and workable law."' 42 In addition, the court for the first time explic-
itly recognized "that the consequences of any partial veto must be a law
that is germane to the topic or subject matter of the vetoed provisions." 143
Wisconsin Senate synthesized three general principles from the cases of
Henry, Finnegan, Martin, Sundby, and Kleczka.'1 First, the Wisconsin
135. Id
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id
139. The Joint Committee on Legislative Organization is a permanent joint legislative com-
mittee of 10 members: the president of the Senate; the speaker of the Assembly; and the majority,
minority, assistant majority, and assistant minority leaders of both houses. BLUE BOOK, supra
note 15, at 287.
140. State ex reL Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429,434,424 N.W.2d 385, 386
(1988).
141. Id. at 437, 424 N.W.2d at 387-88.
142. Id at 437, 424 N.W.2d at 388.
143. Id One commentator discussed the "germaneness" requirement: "The germaneness
limitation recognized by the Wisconsin Senate majority imposes an amorphous limit on guberna-
torial partial veto authority.... Thus, future litigation attempting to define the limits of the
germaneness requirement can be anticipated." Burke, supra note 4, at 1419-20.
144. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 450-51, 424 N.W.2d at 393.
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partial veto was uniquely broad to permit Wisconsin governors to flexibly
deal with omnibus appropriation bills.'45 Second, conditions and provisos
attached to appropriations could be severed by partial veto.'4 6 Third, posi-
tive or negative changes in the legislature's policy did not invalidate a par-
tial veto. 47
Wisconsin Senate radically departed from the policy reasons underlying
the partial veto developed and relied upon in Martin, Sundby, and Kleczka.
"It is interesting that the Martin Court identified anti-logrolling as the pur-
pose of the constitutional amendment giving the Wisconsin governor a par-
tial veto power .... ,,148 Rather, the purpose behind the partial veto was
"to make it easier for the governor to exercise what this court has recog-
nized to be his 'quasi-legislative' role, and to be a pivotal part of the 'omni-
bus' budget bill process."' 4 9
According to the majority in Wisconsin Senate, the grant of the partial
veto power to the governor "was aimed at achieving joint exercise of legisla-
tive authority by the governor and the legislature over appropriation
bills."15 In conclusion, Chief Justice Heffernan stated "that this case
makes no new law. Instead, we simply affirm our prior opinions which
have placed Wisconsin in the singular position of having the most liberal
and elastic constitutional provision-adopted almost 60 years ago-regard-
ing the governor's partial veto authority over appropriation bills."''
A vigorous dissent written by Justice William Bablitch and joined by
Justices Shirley Abrahamson and Donald Steinmetz disagreed with the ma-
jority opinion, which allowed the veto of individual letters.' 52 Justice Bab-
litch argued that an interpretation of article V, section 10 that allows the
governor to create legislation through the use of the partial veto "strained
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 445, 424 N.W.2d at 391.
149. Id. at 446, 424 N.W.2d at 391.
150. Id. at 454, 424 N.W.2d at 395. The majority's statement that the partial veto was aimed
at achieving a joint exercise of the legislative power over appropriations strains the concept of
coextensive powers. Henry explicitly stated that the governor's power to separate was coextensive
with the power of the legislature to combine separate pieces of legislation. State ex rel. Wisconsin
Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 315, 260 N.W. 486, 492 (1935).
151. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 463, 424 N.W.2d at 398. In so stating, Chief Justice
Heffernan evidences a pride in Wisconsin's liberal and flexible constitutional amendment. How-
ever, Judge Richard Posner, sitting on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, stated
that the Wisconsin governor's legislative power emanating from the partial veto was "unusual"
and even "quirky." Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1991).
152. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 466-75, 424 N.W.2d at 399-403 (Bablitch, J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part).
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the English language beyond the breaking point." '153 In addition, Justice
Bablitch commented that allowing the governor to delete individual letters
could not have been the intent of the drafters of article V, section 10 or the
voters who approved it.154 According to Justice Bablitch, the legislative
history of the 1930 amendment indicated that prevention of logrolling was
the intent of the drafters, and the power to veto individual letters was not
required to accomplish that purpose.1 55
Voicing his separation of powers concerns, Justice Bablitch declared
that by granting the governor the power to enact new legislation from an
array of letters, "this court has given the governor extraordinary legislative
power surpassing even that of the legislature." '56 Under the power given to
the governor in the majority opinion, the governor can create new words
and new law by partial veto with the acquiescence of one-third plus one
member of either house of the legislature.1 57 Thus, argued Justice Bablitch,
the majority's opinion allowed the governor to independently legislate,
checked only by the unlikely possibility of a veto override. 158 Therefore,
Justice Bablitch argued for the adoption of the Kleczka standard, which
permitted the veto of whole words. 59 The dissent also sanctioned the par-
tial veto of digits, reasoning that the partial vetoes of digits, unlike letter
vetoes, could not create new legislation.1"
Notwithstanding Justice Bablitch's dissent, Wisconsin Senate allows the
governor to veto any part of an appropriation bill as long as what remains
after the veto is a complete, entire, and workable law. The governor may
also delete individual words, eliminate digits, and reduce the amounts of
appropriations in a budget bill. Guided by these standards, the governor
may even change legislative intent and policy. Additionally, the court held
that the consequences of any partial veto must be a law that is germane to
the topic or subject matter of the vetoed provisions.
153. Id. at 466, 424 N.W.2d at 400 (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
154. Id. (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
155. d at 468, 424 N.W.2d at 400 (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
156. Id. at 471, 424 N.W.2d at 402 (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
* 157. Id. (Bablitch, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). For example, acquiescence
of 12 of the 33 state senators to the governor's partial veto ensures that the parts approved by the
governor become law. The Wisconsin Constitution requires the votes of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of both legislative houses to override a governor's veto. WIS. CONST. art. V, § 100.
158. Wisconsin Senate, 144 Wis. 2d at 471, 424 N.W.2d at 402.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 474, 424 N.W.2d at 403.
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F. Aftermath of State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson
The elimination of any and all obstacles to the governor's partial veto
powers by Wisconsin Senate led to the adoption of an amendment to the
Wisconsin Constitution. 16 1 The amendment provided that a governor may
not veto individual letters in the words of an enrolled bill in order to create
new words. 162  Although the amendment only limited the governor's
unique veto to words, Democratic legislators agreed that the "stop-gap"
constitutional amendment was needed to address the problems created by
the partial veto. 163 In a strong show of support, Wisconsin citizens ratified
the constitutional amendment, sending a message to the government of
Wisconsin that they also were unhappy with the lack of limitations placed
upon the governor's partial veto authority. 16'
V. CONCLUSION
Wisconsin Senate held that the governor of Wisconsin possesses legisla-
tive powers as coextensive as that of the legislature.165 However, the histor-
ical interpretation of the partial veto supports Henry's conclusion that the
governor's coextensive power of partial veto only enables the governor to
pass on each separable piece of legislation contained within an omnibus ap-
propriation bill.' 66
In addition, Henry discussed the implications of legislative intent as a
factor in deciding partial veto validity.167 However, Martin disregarded the
discussion in Henry of legislative intent based on questionable rationale that
may indicate the court's hidden policy decision to steer clear of subjective
considerations concerning tests of partial veto validity.1'68 The court proba-
bly avoided subjective considerations for three reasons: (1) a subjective test
for partial veto validity would foster uncertainty in the legislative process;
(2) subjective tests would place the court between the executive and the
legislature, with the court assuming legislative powers; and (3) a subjective
test would involve the courts every time a partial veto dispute arose.' 6 9
161. S.J. Res. 71, 1987-88 Wis. Legis. (1988).
162. Id.
163. Burke, supra note 4, at 1425-27 (stating that partisan conflicts prevented the legislature
from fully confronting the problems created by the partial veto).
164. Approximately 62% of Wisconsin voters ratified the amendment. Joe Beck, Referen-
dum on Veto Leads to Ward Passage, Wis. ST. J., Apr. 4, 1990, at 3A.
165. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 26-38, 64-66 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 80-82, 85 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
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In adopting the complete and workable law test, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court abandoned subjective limitations on the governor's partial veto au-
thority. However, the complete and workable law test and the definition of
"part" do not provide any limitations on the governor's partial veto pow-
ers.' 70 By choosing the complete and workable law objective test, the court
not only abandoned subjective limitations but all other limitations as well.
As a result, the governor of Wisconsin can create legislation and foil the
Wisconsin Legislature's intent and policies by deleting words, digits, and
punctuation marks. A historical analysis of the partial veto suggests that
article V, section 10 was created to provide the governor with additional
veto power in order to regain the balance of powers between the governor
and the legislature as a result of the adoption of the omnibus appropriation
bill. Instead of obtaining equilibrium between the governor and the legisla-
ture, the partial veto tipped the balance in favor of the governor. 17 1
This Comment argues for the adoption of the Hansen test of partial veto
validity. This objective test states that both the approved remnants and the
portions stricken must be able to stand as complete and workable laws. The
adoption of this test would clearly define the limits of the governor's consti-
tutional role by limiting the governor's exercise of the partial veto to por-
tions of an appropriation bill that are grammatically and structurally
distinct. The court would possess an objective standard capable of clear
and predictable application and would not be required to render decisions
based on subjective criteria. Finally, the Hansen test would quell the legis-
lative use of a creative veto pen and emphasize the point that legislative
power properly resides in the hands of the Wisconsin Legislature.
JOHN S. WEITZER
170. See supra notes 49, 124 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
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